Since 1968, the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP has varied by a factor of 5. In 1972, the ratio stood at above unity, but by 1974, it had fallen to 0.45 where it stayed for the next decade. It then began a steady climb, and today it stands above 2.
Introduction
In this paper, we shall study the post-war behavior of the U.S. stock market. We shall argue that a major technological innovation causes the stock market to be temporarily undervalued until the claims to future dividends enter the stock market via initial public o¤erings (IPOs). In other words, that aggregate capitalization fell below the present value of dividends because a chunk of the dividend-yielding capital stock was temporarily missing from the stock market. Capital is likely to "disappear" during epochs of major technological change -especially at the beginning of such epochs, because this is when new capital forms in small, private companies. Only when a private company promises to be successful is it IPO'd, and only then does its capital stock become a part of stock-market capitalization. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) have used this logic to argue that the information technology (IT ) revolution caused the post-1972 fall and the post-1985 rise in the ratio of market capitalization to GDP. Here, we shall improve on the model that captures this logic, we shall present new evidence on that model, and comment on another proposed explanation for the '70s episode, the …rst OPEC shock. Figure 1 depicts a puzzling phenomenon. The solid line is the market value of U.S. equity relative to GDP since World War II, measured as the ratio of market capitalization to GDP as published by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. After hovering around one all through the '60s, market-cap/GDP plummeted to 0.4 in 1973, Figure 2 : Market capitalization as a fraction of GDP in 5 OECD countries did not recover until the mid-'80s, and it then rose sharply. Figure 2 shows that except for Japan, the leading OECD countries experienced similar movements in their stock markets. The …gure plots market capitalization as a fraction of GDP for Japan, Canada, and 3 European countries. If one were to combine the panels of 2, one would obtain a "world" series that would look much like the solid line in Figure 1 . Japan is an outlier, but too small to overturn the broad pattern in the rest of the advanced world. Mehra (1998) argues that the kind of volatility that Figures 1 and 2 portray is not consistent with the standard stochastic growth model, and Hall (1999) notes that the standard model implies a puzzling "meltdown" of capital in '73-4. The puzzle, in terms of Figure 1 , is the nearly threefold decline in market-cap/GDP in '73-4, followed by its …vefold rise since '85. The literature o¤ers three solutions to the puzzle. First, that the …rst oil crisis, combined, perhaps, with a reaction in monetary policy, reduced expected future pro…ts of …rms and, as a result, led to a drop in stock prices. Second, that the decline of the '70s re ‡ected a response of risk-averse investors to a secular rise in the volatility of stock returns. And, third, that a positive bubble burst, or a negative one formed in '73 and that today a positive bubble exists, especially in the internet stocks.
This paper takes on a di¤erent view. The view is that good news arrived in the early '70s, news that information technology was on the horizon. show that stock prices fell just after Intel had developed the microprocessor in late 1971, and just as IT investment, plotted in Figure 3 , was about to take o¤. In '68, IT comprised only 7 percent of equipment investment, but it then started to rise, reaching 56 percent in '98, and is rising still. It seems natural, therefore, to label the early '70s as the date in which "the news about IT arrived". Arrived, in the sense that this is when it started to matter, and when American business started incorporating it in a major way.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the main assumptions and, then, the model. Section 3 describes several tests of the IT hypothesis. Section 4 considers some other explanations. Section 5 outlines further tests, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
The IT hypothesis
Our argument rests on three assumptions. First, that the success of the IT revolution became evident in the early '70s. Second, that the IT revolution favored new …rms, that incumbents resisted it, and that this caused their values to fall. And, third, that as a policing device, mergers and takeovers worked imperfectly, thereby allowing incumbents' values to fall and remain low until the mid-'80s. We now explain why we …nd these assumptions reasonable.
Assumption 1: The IT revolution was heralded in 1973, or perhaps in stages during Before 1971, the computer was no friend of small business. A computer was expensive and users shared computer-time. Mainframe computers and minicomputers had been used at some large companies, at NASA, at the Defense Department, at the Bureau of the Census, and at other federal and local government bureaus. But it would take a technological leap before the computer could transform the way business was done, and before any …rm, large or small, could a¤ord to provide one to each of its administrative workers.
That technological leap was the invention of the microprocessor -the "4004 computer chip." This invention made the powerful "PC" of today possible. By late '71 Intel was advertising the chip, 1 and commercial implementation followed at once: A French company produced the "MICRAL," a general purpose computer that embodied the new chip. "A base model cost under $2,000, and it found a market replacing minicomputers for simple control operations. Around two thousand were sold in the next two years...." (Ceruzzi, 1998, p. 222) . 2 In the U.S., the early adopters of the new microprocessor -Intel's "4004" miniature computer -were outside the corporate sector, which surprised even Intel's sales sta¤. 3 Intel had IPO'd in October of '71 and, by August '72, it had released its second microprocessor -the "8008". 4 To be sure, the early microprocessor was a primitive ancestor of today's PC -it had no keyboard, no screen, and a small fraction of the power. But, by early '73, it should have been clear that now one could expect rapid development of both hardware 1 "Robert Noyce [The 1968 co-founder of INTEL] negotiated a deal with Busicom [a Japanese calculator manufacturer] to manufacture for Intel chips [that Intel had designed] at a lower cost giving Intel, in return, the right to market the chips. From these unsophisticated negotiations with Busicom, in Noyce's words, came a pivotal moment in the history of computing.
"The result was a set of four chips, …rst advertised in a trade journal in late 1971, which included 'a microprogrammable computer on a chip!' That was the 4004, on which one found all the basic registers and control functions of a tiny, general-purpose stored-program computer. The other chips contained a read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), and a chip to handle output functions. The 4004 became the historical milestone, but the other chips were important as well, especially the ROM chip that supplied the code that turned a general-purpose processor into something that could meet a customer's needs." (Ceruzzi 1998 , p. 220). 2 Similarly, Campbell-Kelly and Aspray (1996, p. 237) write that it was "possible to produce an a¤ordable personal computer (costing less than $2000, say) any time after...November 1971." Indeed, by March of 1974, Intel was o¤ering the kit for the Scelbi-8H minicomputer for as low as $440 (Ceruzzi, 1998, p. 225) . 3 "Since it was a miniature general-purpose computer, [the 4004] could be used by industrial designers to do any number of di¤erent jobs. The customization would be in the software.... The target customers for this use of the 4004 chip were engineers in America's biggest industrial companies. But most of these engineers knew nothing about computer programming. Instead, it was smaller, hungrier companies without a strong, entrenched market position that saw the potential of the tiny chip …rst....The early adopters of the 4004 were much more obscure. Someone inside Intel's marketing department described the 4004 customer list as "not so much Who's Who as Who's That?" " (Jackson 1997, p. 75) 4 Two buyers of the 8008 were none other than Bill Gates and Paul Allen who used it for a project that failed (Jackson 1997, p. 76 ). and software. By "Moore's Law" (the observation that the power of microprocessors doubles every 18 months) the power of computers would quickly become phenomenal, and, as soon as the software needed to turn the computer into a multi-purpose problem-solver became available -and this was just a matter of time -the computer would transform the face of American business.
It may well be that the world realized more gradually that computers would transform things in a big way. Our story works -and we do not resist this interpretationif, instead of one big news ‡ash in late 1973, the news came in several stages, starting in 1968 or so, and ending in 1974. This was the period during which the P/Y ratio declined by a factor of three, with some bumps along the way. For simplicity, though, we shall model the episode by assuming that all the information arrived at once.
Assumption 2: The IT revolution favored new …rms An old …rm has old physical capital on hand, and so it faces an additional economic cost to investing in frontier methods. It also has old human capital on hand; its manager may lack the awareness and its workers may lack the skill to implement the new technology (e.g., in 1972, large companies didn't have the programming expertise needed to use the microprocessor productively). In short, incumbents have a comparative disadvantage in adopting new technology. This is the "sunk cost" argument that we have seen in vintage capital growth models, in incumbent vs. potential-entrant models of R&D such as Reinganum (1983) , and elsewhere.
An even more telling reason why an incumbent …rm will resist change is the entrenchment of its personnel. A large company is likely to be top-heavy, and its employees more likely to be drawing salaries that do not re ‡ect their performance -a CEO with a handsome "golden parachute" has little reason to do anything for his …rm, much less learn something new. Golden parachutes are severance payments that, along with a host of other defensive measures became popular in the early '80s, stimulated into being by the rash of hostile tender bids .
Based on this logic, our model will assume that when the news of the new technology arrives, the market correctly expects an incumbent to go on doing business as usual -inde…nitely.
Assumption 3: Mergers and takeovers are an imperfect policing device Whether management is separate from ownership or not, we believe that we need to assume a friction in the takeover market. We reason as follows: Suppose that a friction between owners and managers puts half of the rents in the manager's pocket. Then, shareholders would still want a manager who can generate the highest total rent. If the …rm has a manager at the helm who cannot handle IT, a frictionless takeover market would transfer the …rm to someone who can. A frictionless takeover market cannot lead …rm to their …rst-best e¢ciency levels, but it should be able to maintain manager-…rm matches at their second-best optimum. If so, the arrival of a new technology that some managers cannot implement would usher in a merger-wave and, instead of losing value, incumbents would simply face reorganization. One would expect this outcome even if ownership is separate from control and even if manages skim some percentage from the …rm's rents. Knowing they can get, say, just 50% of the rents, the …rm's shareholders would still want the most e¢cient manager running things and would welcome any bidder that could e¤ect this change. An argument of this sort is implicit in Gort (1969) . It says that the shock should prompt takeovers, but no reductions in value.
But that is not what happened in the early '70s. Instead, values fell and stayed low, and the merger wave took place not in the '70s but in the '80s. But when the wave …nally did form, it was the …rst obvious "cleansing" merger wave: In their study of mergers in this period, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) …nd not just that targets of hostile takeovers show signs of managerial malfunction, but that they show it all too clearly. In a sample of about 371 large …rms of which 40 were acquired between '81 and '85, the average 1980 Tobin's q of a target of a future hostile bid was 0:52, as compared to the average q of 0:85 for the sample as a whole. In other words, the targets had q values about 40% below average. Morck et al found that most of the di¤erential arose because the targets were in declining industries. But in a larger sample of manufacturing plants, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) found that takeover targets had TFP levels 5% smaller than that of an average plant in their industry. In short, targets are in the wrong industries, and on top of that, they are less productive than the average competitor. Since the current productivity di¤erential was small relative to the di¤erential in q, it would seem that the …rms in question were targeted for takeover less for their currently-low productivity than for their poor long-run prospects, and the model we present will have a drop in incumbents' values for precisely this reason.
Given that a …rm's q could fall by nearly 50% before it was taken over, and given that it took the best part of a decade for hostile takeovers to get o¤ the ground, one may well ask if takeovers serve a policing function at all. Shleifer and Vishny (1988) outline some major frictions in the disciplining role of takeovers. Insidersmanagement and unionized workers especially -can protect themselves from hostile takeovers. Their …rm may guarantee them a lot more than they are worth. To succeed, a raider would need to buy such people out, and the cost of doing so could exceed the e¢ciency gains that he could bring to the …rm, in which case the takeover will not take place. Moreover, as Grossman and Hart (1981) argue, incumbent shareholders too can hold out and extract the e¢ciency gain from the acquiring …rm. 5 These barriers have meant that a takeover has to raise value by about 40% before it goes through, and that, as a result, a …rm can lose value and not be taken over.
Where the takeover hurdle is too high, the ine¢cient …rm stays in business until it is driven out by more e¢cient entrants. This process is slower than the takeover, and this may be why the market took more than 10 years to recover. But, recover it did, and the painful adjustments are now taking place 6 . Not surprisingly, the "excess fat" is mostly among managerial and nonproduction workers (Lichtenberg and Siegel 1990) . 7 And since the adoption of IT is in many …rms probably long overdue, some …rms are seeing extremely high rates of return on their IT investments. 8 
The model
The model is a version of the Lucas (1978) economy. A similar model in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) had counterfactual implications for interest rates, and we shall depart from it in two ways. First, in order to allow obsolescence into the model, our economy will have two types of fruit and, second, fruit is an intermediate good that …rms use to make a single …nal good -fruit juice. So, this is a production economy with a single …nal good, two intermediate goods, no storage, and a …xed capital stock, trees, that does not depreciate physically.
Let y t denote gallons of juice produced and consumed at date t. Preferences are
Competitive …rms make juice using apples, x, oranges, z, and a third factor, n, as its inputs in the constant-returns-to-scale production function for …nal goods
taking the prices of fruit, p x and p z as given. The factor n is …xed; we shall normalize its supply to equal 1, and de…ne F (x; z)´¹ F (x; z; 1) 6 Farber and Hallock (1999) …nd that over the past thirty years, announcements about labor-force reductions are increasingly likely to lead to stock-price increases. The authors argue that such an anouncement is now more likely to signal a rise in e¢ciency, and is less likely than before to re ‡ect a reduction in product demand. 7 This will seem odd to anyone who thinks of the unionized blue collar worker as the prime machine-resister. But the computer displaces mainly white-collar labor ("Behind each ATM ‡utter the ghosts of three bank-tellers," says a recent N.Y.Times article), and so this is where one would expect to be able to cut costs the most. In their study of the Indian iron and steel industry, Das and Sengupta (1999) …nd that in the typical (presumably sheltered) public sector …rm, managerial workers are much more overemployed than the production workers. 8 "Using eight years of data for over 1000 …rms in the United States, we …nd that an increase of one dollar in the quantity of computer capital installed by a …rm is associated with an increase of …ve to 20 dollars in the …nancial markets' valuation of the …rm. Other forms of capital do not exhibit these high valuations." (Brynjolfsson and Yang 1998, p. 1) . If these numbers are even close to being correct, IT must have met with some pretty sti¤ resistance.
The numeraire is y t . Optimal input choice means that prices of x and z must equal their marginal products:
Since returns are constant, factor payments equal output, and …rms make zero pro…ts. The proceeds from the sales of apples and oranges are paid out as dividends. Claims to the apple-tree and orange-tree dividends trade freely at prices P x;t and P z;t respectively. If the stream of dividends that these trees will pay is fx t g and fz t g, the date-¿ "cum-dividend" prices of the trees would be
Before the shock
Initially, there are no orange trees. The economy comprises a unit measure of apple trees, each yielding x apples. Output and consumption are y = F (x; 0) ; and expected to remain there inde…nitely. Any change in this state of a¤airs is thought to be impossible, or at least, highly improbable. The aggregate stock market value or "market capitalization", is then,
for all ¿ , because by Euler's Theorem @F @x (x; 0) x = (1 ¡ s) y, where s is the cost-share of the factor n. The ratio of market capitalization to GDP is just (1 ¡ s) = (1 ¡¯).
News arrives at date zero
News arrives at t = 0 that a unit-measure of orange trees will spring forth at the beginning of date T , and that each tree will yield z oranges per period. At date T -and not at date zero -agents will also expect to receive an equal share of claims to the output of these orange trees. This assumed delay is supposed to re ‡ect the reality that a new company takes years before reaching its initial public o¤ering. The arrival of the orange trees permanently raises the output of juice to
Until date T , stockholders will only receive the dividends from the apple trees. All this becomes known at date zero, and no further shocks are expected.
The e¤ect of the news on stock prices
In what follows, we shall assume that s, the share of the third input, is constant. Since (1 ¡ s) y = F (x; 0) = @F (x;0) @x x the apple trees will command a price of
and market capitalization now becomes.
or t¸T :
Note that we have de…ned P z;t to equal zero for t · T ¡ 1, even though, even before date T , the value of the sprouting orange trees would be positive if they were to trade on the stock market. When the news arrives, P x;t , and therefore M t as well, falls for two reasons. First, the rate of interest between date T ¡ 1 and date T rises because that is when output rises permanently from y to y 0 . Before date T arrives, dividends beyond date T ¡1 are now discounted at a higher rate, i.e., they are multiplied by the factor
1.
This e¤ect cannot really explain the stock-market drop, however, because the real rate of interest simply did not rise by that much during the '70s and '80s. Moreover, in an open economy, if the price of juice at all dates was …xed and constant, the interest-rate impact does not exist, even in theory.
The second e¤ect is a possible obsolescence of apples -oranges may displace apples as an input and, assuming that apples and oranges are substitutes in the production of juice this would show up as a lower price of x; in that
. The largest impact would occur if the arrival of oranges were to make apples fully obsolete so that F x (x; z) = 0. This would happen, e.g., if people wanted at most one glass of juice, and if they preferred that juice to be pure orange. The value of the apple trees relative to GDP would then be
The impact of the news at date zero would be 1 ¡¯T , which, at T = 12 and¯= 0:96 would represent a 61 percent drop -the largest that this model can deliver. To get a drop of this size, however, requires that we assume the value of incumbents to be zero after date T , and this, as we shall see, does not …t the facts. After the orange trees start to trade, the ratio M t =y t reverts to its pre-news level of (1 ¡ s) = (1 ¡¯) : Figure 4 shows the predicted time path of M t =y t before and after the news arrives -it is the theoretical counterpart of Figure 1 5. In a closed economy, the model predicts an rise, at date zero, in the T ¡ period interest rate. In an open economy, a permanent increase in consumption at date zero -or when the news about the IT revolution arrives.
This section takes up each implication in turn. Figure 4 states that incumbents do not take part in the date-T recovery of the stock market. To test this proposition, we need to know who the '72 incumbents were. Most are covered by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data. The lower, dashed line in Figure 1 is the ratio of market capitalization to GDP for the dataset published by the CRSP that contains the stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. The top, solid line is the capitalization of all …rms from aggregate data provided by the Federal Reserve Board. The di¤erence between the intercepts of the top and bottom lines is the '72 capitalization of stocks that traded over the counter and that, therefore, were not then covered by the CRSP data. Because of mergers that took place after 1972, the "fate" of the '72 incumbents is a little ambiguous. Some incumbents merged with …rms that entered after '72. If so, does the new value belong to the old vintage or to the new? We call this ambiguous class of …rms hybrids. We shall distinguish these hybrid incumbents from pure '72 incumbents that did not merge with any post-'72-vintage …rms. An incumbent is either hybrid or pure. 9 Figure 5 shows that relative to GDP, the '72 CRSP incumbents' value fell by more than 50 percent over a few years, and never fully recovered. Yet, since '85 the value of the market relative to GDP has tripled! The source of this new value must, therefore, be …rms that entered after '72, roughly as Figure 4 asserts.
The extraordinary decline of the '72 incumbents
The '72 incumbents thus fared badly, and entrants did spectacularly well, some 15 years later. But, is this at all unusual? After all, we know that even after one controls for survivorship bias, small …rms grow faster than large ones, and we believe that all …rms must die sooner or later and make way for new …rms. The question, then, shouldn't be whether the '72 incumbents did badly relative to subsequent entrants, but rather, whether the '72 incumbents did badly when compared with incumbents of other vintages. What became of incumbents that, at a corresponding stage in their existence, did not have to cope with technological change as major as IT ? Figure 6 plots the market shares of three incumbent-vintages against their "age" (de…ned as calendar time minus their vintage). If no security traded over the counter, all three curves would begin at 100 percent. Instead, the intercepts of the curves rise with vintage, implying that over-the-counter trading has declined relative to market trading. The capitalization of stocks that traded over the counter declined from 45 percent of total capitalization in '48, to 28 percent in '60, and …nally to 17.5 percent in '72. This decline probably took place because stock market trading has become much easier over time, a trend that is itself due in part to the computer. Figure  6 also shows that the '72 incumbents lost market share much faster than the other two generations. At age 26, the share of all three generations is around 50 percent, even though the '72 incumbents start o¤ with an eleven percent higher market share. Thus, the '72 incumbents did worse than the other generations. 
Entrants gained value mainly at the IPO stage
In the model, all the loss in incumbents' share happens at the time of IPO, at date T . Thereafter, the rate of return on the shares of the new …rms equals the rate of return on the shares of the old …rms. This is precisely what happened, although there is no single date, \T " at which all the new …rms enter. Figure 7 plots, by entrant vintage, the annualized real return between time of entry and 1998 on value-weighted portfolios continually reinvested in these entrants. This is the solid line in the graph. The dashed line is the annualized average real return on a portfolio consisting of all the …rms in the market at time t. This …gure shows that most generations of entrants did slightly worse than incumbents after they entered. This is consistent with the evidence in Ritter (1991) . Two recent exceptions are the 1986 and 1990 vintages, which include Microsoft and Cisco Systems respectively.
This means that all of the market share that entrants gained, they gained at the outset, at their IPOs. Thereafter, they did not gain market share. In other words, the '72 incumbents were displaced largely by capital created outside the stock market and brought into the stock market at the time of the entrants' IPOs, exactly as the model asserts. After they did grab a share of stock market value at their IPOs, the post-'72 entrants did not perform better than incumbents, and, therefore, did not gain further market share.
This all …ts with the recognized fact that since the mid-'80s the U.S. stock market has been carried by its large-cap …rms. The performance of entrants in their early post-entry period is probably similar to that of small …rms in which ownership is Figure 8 : Performance of small companies vs. large companies closer to management, in which it is likely that fewer workers are unionized, and fewer management practices are outdated. Figure 8 plots the ratio of the Ibbotson small cap index to the S&P 500 index. 10 During the period '74 -'82, small cap stocks outperformed the S&P 500 by a factor of nearly 4. Since then, the S&P 500 has done better than the small caps, probably because, by the early '80s and the advent of the junk-bond, ine¢cient large …rms began to feel stronger hostile-takeover pressures, and responded by becoming more e¢cient. The strong performance of the small caps in the '74-82 period mirrors the small product-market performance of small relative to large …rms evident in Figure 8 of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) .
If so much value was, indeed, …nanced at the pre-IPO stage, then who …nanced it? Initially, the hidden entrepreneurs may have …nanced themselves, or formulated their ideas while working for established companies, but as their projects matured they would have needed outside funds. At that point, in the late '70s and early '80s, perhaps, we would expect to see banks raise their lending to small business. The data do not show a general rise in bank lending during the mid-to-late '70s, except for a pronounced rise in 1973, and a subsequent reversion of the loan-GDP ratio to about 33 percent of GDP, as Figure 9 , based on data analyzed by Craig and Haubrich (1999), shows. We do not have micro evidence on whether banks directed more loans towards small businesses in the mid-to-late '70 and early '80s and this is something worth pursuing further.
This points to a data limitation that our study has faced from the outset, namely the lack of …rm-level debt-data for any of the CRSP …rms before 1970, and their sporadic availability since 1970. To test the IT hypothesis, it would have been better to compute the value of a …rm by adding its debt to the value of its shares, because this is the total value of the claims on a …rm's pro…t. This can be done in the aggregate, and Hall (1999) has done so. Using data from the Federal Reserve Board's Flow of Funds Accounts on equity and debt he has shown that these data also show a drop in '73. For individual …rms, however, debt data as detailed as the CRSP equity data are hard to …nd. We merged the CRSP data with the COMPUSTAT debt data, which we have only for the past three decades, with less and less representation the farther back one goes so that in the early 1970's, we are left with debt data on mainly large …rms. We have, nevertheless, analyzed this restricted sample, and the results were qualitatively the same as the ones that we present here. 11 
IT -intensive sectors lost more value in '73
The service sector has invested much more heavily in IT than has the manufacturing sector, and, within the service sector, the FIRE segment of services being the …rst to do so. Figure 10 reports the fate of the '72 incumbents by major sector: Manufacturing, FIRE, services, and Transportation, Communication and Public Utilities. Two things emerge from Figure 10 . First, the biggest '73 value drops occurred where subsequent IT investment was the highest. The smallest '72-'74 decline is in manu- The point is, not being as much "at risk" from IT, manufacturing …rms were not hit as hard by it as other sectors were. This is all summarized in Table 1 . The table reports two di¤erent measures of exposure to IT. The …rst, a ‡ow concept, is the average real investment share of IT equipment in equipment investment for '74-'96. The second, stock concept, is the share of real IT equipment in the real total stock of equipment. All data are from the BEA's tangible wealth table. The …rst measures more closely the costs of adopting IT, the second measures the use of IT in production. The two measures di¤er when industries' rates of investment are not constant. The stock measure conforms much better to the theory -a clear positive relation exists between the second and third columns. 12 We also regressed the '73-4 percentage drop of sector i, denoted by D i , on the log of the capital share of IT in the '96 equipment capital stock (measured in '92 prices, taken from the BEA tangible wealth table), denoted by CapS i , and on the log of the share of the '72 incumbents in the sector's '98 market value, denoted by IncS i . The regression results for the 52 sectors for which we have data are 
Hence, (i) the more IT intensive a sector turned out to be the higher its drop in '73, and (ii) the more threatened incumbents were by entry in the '74-'96 period the higher, again, was the drop. This evidence is consistent with our hypothesis.
Entry, exit, and M&A's rose in the late '70s and early '80s
The model assumes a T -period gestation for the new tehnology following its announcement. At date T all the new entrants come in. Market shares are then reshued, and, stretching things a bit, we may expect to see some exit. The news Figure 11 : Entry, exit, and reasons for exit from stock market arrives at date zero, which corresponds to 1973 on the calendar, and therefore the re-shue should occur at date 1973 + T . We now look at some indicators of creative destruction -entry, exit, incorporations, IPO's, takeover, and mergers -which suggest that T is somewhere between 5 and 10 years, depending which indicator one looks at. The plot in the top panel of Figure 11 shows a pronounced rise in both entry and exit in the CRSP 13 , denoted in terms of their share of the total market capitalization. Exits begin to rise in 1975, but entry does not rise markedly until 1980. The bottom two panels of …gure 11 depict the reasons for exit. The peak in exit in the '80s is due Figure 12 : The rate of business incorporations and the number of IPO's mainly to mergers and exchanges, consistent with the evidence in Golbe and White (1993) . The share of …rms liquidated also peaked in the early 80s. The fraction of value dropped from the market, mainly because the …rm decides to stop to be traded on the market, is fairly constant for the post war period. Figure 12 shows that incorporations rise markedly after 1975, and Figure 13 shows that real exits have risen substantially, but only since the early '80s, and that they remain high.
14 Together with the entry rate, we also plot the number of IPO's at least $1.5 million in size. 15 Since the '80s IPO's are much higher than they were in the '70s, although not much higher than they were during the '60s.
In the manufacturing sector, the rate of gross job ‡ows shows a slight, but relatively unbroken downward trend. This does not support our argument, but, as we shall shortly document, the manufacturing sector has invested the least in IT, and is the least likely to o¤er empirical support for our argument. Moreover, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1999, Figure 6 ) …nd that there has been a rise in the permanent (i.e., exceeding two years) component of job-destruction. That is, a job is now less likely 14 The entry and exit data plotted in Figures 12 and 13 are rates per 10,000 registered enterprises. The data were provided us by Valerie Ramey; she had presented them in a discussion at the NBER Fluctuations meeting, July 17, 1999. 15 More details on these data are in Ibbotson et al (1994) . Figure 13 : The rate of failure of businesses to be destroyed, but when it is gone, it is gone for good. This also explains why unemployment duration has risen in the 1990s, a time when the unemployment rate is generally falling. Gross job- ‡ows may have slightly declined, but, on the other hand, gross ‡ows of capital have risen. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) compiled a gross-capital- ‡ow series, reproduced in Figure 14 , that shows a de…nite rise since the '80s, especially in capital destruction.
The CRSP data also show a rise in destruction -exits, whether because of failure or because of merger -have risen. The results in Table 2 report on the fate of entrants ten years after their CRSP entry. Each row reports the percentage of entrants exiting by a decade's end. The …rst row gives the percentage of entrants that merged or 'exchanged' at some point during the decade. Mergers and exchanges have risen sharply over time: In '85-'95, exits for these two reasons were 2.5 times higher than they had been in '45-'55 and even 2 times higher than during the 60s merger wave. Some old …rms are entering the IT era by acquiring the small innovators.
The last two rows of Table 2 present …gures on genuine exits from the CRSP. A "drop" arises when a …rm stops being traded, usually because its value has fallen below a critical level. Combined with "liquidations", such exits have risen dramatically -by a factor of 13. 
Consumption rose sharply in the '70s
Since the real interest rate did not change much during the seventies, the IT hypothesis implies that consumption should have risen when the good news arrived. In the model consumption cannot rise until date T because the model includes neither capital nor imports, but in fact consumption could and, indeed, did rise in the '70s. The U.S. personal savings rate was at a 30-year high in '73, and has declined dramatically since then. U.S. personal consumption was at 61.5 percent of GDP in '73, it rose to 63 percent in '74, and it has been rising more or less steadily ever since. Moreover, Parker (1999) shows that consumption has been rising the most among the youngest cohorts, and this is what should have happened if the good news included a forecast of higher wages for them in the '90s. Overall, the …ve informal tests seem to con…rm the model's implications. Before turning to the the alternative hypothesis of a sharp rise in oil prices in 1973, we mention in passing an alternative hypothesis, namely cheaper stock-market participation. We have interpreted the rise in stock-market entry as the creative destruction of inept incumbents, and the observed rise in exits, etc., supports this interpretation. But the rise in entry may have taken place for a di¤erent reason: It is now much cheaper to raise money on the stock market because of computerized trading and the NASDAQ, and this would induce more …rms to list. The prospect of a future entry of small …rms could have reduced the rents to those who had already paid the entry cost and may even explain a part of the stock-market drop of the early '70s. Not an instance of cleansing but simply a more democratization of stock-market …nancing.
This hypothesis may be worth developing further, but we cannot pursue that here.
The role of the …rst oil-shock
The …rst OPEC shock may also explain a part of the drop in the stock market in the early '70s, as well as a part of the productivity slowdown of the '70s (which our model does not explain). One argument says that the 80% rise in the price of energy, reinforced perhaps by a reaction by the Fed in setting its monetary policy, lowered expected pro…ts for U.S. …rms and, as such, depressed the stock market. The attractive thing about this explanation is that oil prices behaved the same way globally, and therefore their behavior may, perhaps, explain the universally bad performance of stock markets in the '70s and early '80s. But, monetary policies di¤ered by country, and so the reinforcement, which may have harmed stock prices in the U.S., did not exist elsewhere. Therefore, if we are to explain the collapse in the world's stock markets, we are left with the oil-shock by itself.
Three problems plague the oil-shock explanation. First, the large '79 shock had no impact at all on the variables plotted in the …rst two …gures. Second, a rise in oil prices should have lowered current pro…ts more than future pro…ts, because of the greater ease of …nding substitutes for oil on the long run, perhaps current output more than future output and, therefore, should have produced a rise in the ratio of market capitalization to GDP, not a fall. Moreover, this scenario does not suggest any entry in the stock market, and so, it implies that the share of the incumbent …rms is constant at 1. Hence it also cannot explain the entry-driven increase in market value relative to GDP that we have observed in the late 80s and 90s. Similarly, a rise in oil prices should have lowered current dividends more than future dividends, and yet Figure 16 plots Market capitalization relative to dividends, and this ratio also fell in '73 instead of rising as one would have expected if the oil shock was to blame for the drop in capitalization in '73-4.
The third di¢culty with the oil-price shock explanation for the stock-market drop is that the energy-intensive sectors did not experience the largest drop in value in '73-4. Our own model says that the IT-intensive sectors should be where the drop is the largest in '73-4, whereas the oil-price hypothesis says that they should be the oil-intensive sectors. We run a statistical horse race and …nd that IT wins hands down.
The dependent variable in the regressions in Table 3 is the percentage drop in the market capitalization of sector i in the '72-'74 period, and it comes from the CRSP. Thus a positive value is a drop, a negative value a rise. The regressors should measure the relevance of IT and the relevance of oil prices. The …rst regressor is the logarithm of the share of computer and related equipment in the '96 real equipment capital stock of sector i, in '92 dollars, and it comes from the BEA's tangible wealth table. It measures how important IT was in the subsequent investment in sector Figure 16 : Market capitalization over dividend payments i, and our model says that its coe¢cient should be positive, because sectors with a lot of investment-exposure to IT should have been the hardest hit by the new technology. The second regressor is essentially the 25-year survival rate of the '72 incumbents' capital and arguably proxies for resistance to change in that sector; this variable is the logarithm of the '96 share of the '72 incumbents in the market capitalization of sector i, and it, too, comes from the CRSP. Our model says that its coe¢cient should be negative: Sectors in which value falls most should be ones in which entrants add the most value later on. The fourth regressor is the log of the '72 share of oil in the production costs of sector i -dollars spent (directly and indirectly, i.e., through inputs from other sectors) on crude petroleum and natural gas per 100 dollars of the output produced. These data come from the '72 input-output tables. Our sectors do not completely correspond to the ones in the input output table, so we have matched them as well as we could. Finally, if by some chance the IT -intensive sectors were hit harder than others by the recession of '73-'74, the outcome could be due to the recession and not to IT. To handle this possibility we include as a regressor the '73-'74 the growth rate of real output of the sector. Moreover, durable goods are more cyclical than others, and so to control for this concern, we include a dummy variable which is one for durable goods producing sectors (Construction, Furniture, Industrial machinery, Electronic and electric equipment, Motor vehicles, Transportation equipment, Instruments).
The regressions in Table 3 show that oil did not cause the stock market drop in '73-'74, and they favor the IT -interpretation -both of the IT variables are of the correct sign and they di¤er signi…cantly from zero. The coe¢cient associated with oil is not signi…cant and, in fact, has the opposite sign from what one would have expected. That is, the sectors that were the least energy intensive dropped the most in value. The inclusion of the durable goods dummy doesn't change the conclusion. Table 4 lists the cross correlations between the regressand and regressors that we considered. Our model would predict a higher correlation between the ex post IT intensity of the industries and their incumbent shares. The data, however, suggest that this correlation is close to zero, ¡0:046 to be precise. This is probably because the incumbent variable does not only proxy for the degree of resistance but also for the degree of deregulation in the various sectors. That is, sectors that are deregulated generally see a lot of entry of new …rms. The most notable example of this is Sprint and MCI's threat to AT&T's telecommunications monopoly.
The coe¢cient of the '98 share of the '72 incumbents may be biased in the negative direction. Suppose, for instance, that some markets were hit by adverse and permanent demand shocks in 1974. Along the lines of Tobin's q theory of investment, incumbents that su¤ered the largest decline in market cap in '73-4 would, presumably, invest less than other …rms. If our sectors do not quite match the markets that are hit by these shocks, the …rms in the declining sectors would appear as losers of market share in sectors as we measure them, and one should see a negative coe¢cient of the '98 -share variable in Table 3 . But this logic does not imply that the '96 share of IT coe¢cient is biased, because this variable measures the composition of investment rather than its scale.
We should mention one similarity between the oil shock and the arrival of IT as we have interpreted it: Each made life harder for the stock market incumbent. But the adjustment costs that they imposed on the incumbent were fundamentally di¤erent. A rise in the price of an input is something that a …rm deals with all the time, and it should not present it with the kind of reorganization problem that the arrival of IT called for. Because of that fact, the oil shock story cannot explain why entrants were so important in the subsequent market rise.
Wei (2000) has studied of the e¤ects of the …rst OPEC shock in greater detail and she, too, …nds that the energy-intensive sectors were not the ones that su¤ered the greatest price declines in '73-4. Therefore, while the oil shock may have played a role in generating the productivity slowdown of the '70s, and perhaps in delaying entry of IT -implementors until the early '80s, it does not seem to explain the behavior of the stock market.
Conclusion
The vintage capital model teaches us that technological change destroys old capital. We have gone further and argued that major technological change -like the IT revolution -destroys old …rms. It does so by making machines, workers and managers obsolete. Product-market entry of new …rms and new capital takes time, and their stock market entry takes even longer. In the meantime, the stock market declines. We have argued that aggregate valuation can fall below the present value of dividends because capital may "disappear" right after a major technological shift, as new capital forms in small, private companies. Later, these companies are IPO'd, and only then does their value become a part of stock-market capitalization.
This was a report on our case study of a technological revolution. The study used a wealth of information on thousands of …rms over dozens of years, but it remains, nevertheless, a case study. We have, in a sense, studied just one data point: The IT revolution in the U.S. A logical next step is to study how IT is spreading to other countries, and to see if incumbents are su¤ering the sorts of declines in value that they did in the U.S. A harder task is to see how incumbents dealt with the technological revolutions of the past. Firm-level data for these epochs will be harder to …nd, but we think we know what the other major revolutions were -a hundred years ago the revolutionary technologies were electricity and internal combustion, and two hundred years ago, it was steam. ² Figure 5 : The CRSP does not contain data on the merger partners of all …rms that exit due to mergers from the dataset. To be speci…c, CRSP contains 3168 …rms that exit due to exchanges or mergers, for which their merger partners are unaccounted for. For 1075 of these …rms we have found their merger partner, which is part of the CRSP, in various editions of the Semi Annual Stock Reports. The other 2093 …rms either merged with partners that were not in the CRSP or were not tractable.
² Figure 9 : Total value of loans is taken from Craig and Haubrich (1999) . Total value of …rms is based on Flow of Funds accounts.
² Figure 11 : Firms that enter as the result of a merger between two other …rms are not counted as entrants.
² Figure 16 : Total dividend payments are taken from the Flow of Funds accounts.
² Cross sectoral regressions: Based on two and some three digit SIC industries. Data on value drop and incumbent share constructed from the CRSP. Real output growth is obtained by combining nominal output data from the Gross Product Originating tables published by the BEA with producer price indices published by the BLS.
